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Abstract
Despite accelerating globalization, most people still eat food that was grown locally . Developing
countries with weak purchasing power tend to import as little food as possible from global
markets, suffering consumption deficits during times of high prices or production declines.
Local agricultural production, therefore, is critical to both food security and economic
development among the rural poor. The level of local agricultural production, in turn, will be
controlled by the amount and quality of arable land, the amount and quality of agricultural inputs
(fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, etc.), as well as farm-related technology, practices, and policies. In
this paper we discuss several emerging threats to global and regional food security, including
declining yield gains that are failing to keep up with population increases, and warming in the
tropical Indian Ocean and its impact on rainfall
 . If yields continue to grow more slowly than per
capita harvested area, parts of Africa, Asia, and Central and Southern America will experience
substantial declines in per capita cereal production. Global per capita cereal production will
potentially decline by 14 percent between 2008 and 2030. Climate change is likely to further
affect food production, particularly in regions that have very low yields due to lack of
technology. Drought, caused by anthropogenic warming in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, may
also reduce 21 st century food availability by disrupting Indian Ocean moisture transports and
tilting the 21 st
 century climate toward a more El Ni–o-like state. The impacts of these circulation
changes over Asia remain uncertain. For Africa, however, Indian Ocean warming appears to
have already reduced main growing season rainfall along the eastern edge of tropical Africa,
from southern Somalia to northern parts of the Republic of South Africa. Through a
combination of quantitative modeling of food balances and an examination of climate change,
we present an analysis of emerging threats to global food security.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090027894 2019-08-30T07:30:36+00:00Z
1.0 Introduction
Despite accelerating globalization, food security in most of the developing world depends upon
local food production. Most rural citizens in developing nations are involved in agriculture
(Lamb 2000). Most locally produced goods are consumed locally, so increasing local
productivity and slowing population growth remains a central food security issue (Devereux and
Maxwell 2001; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007). Over the past few years, energy price
increases, biofuels, and food scarcity have led to higher global food prices and price volatility1.
Rapidly increasing consumer prices limit food access. Increased p rice volatility reduces the
benefit that small scale farmers derive from higher producer prices. Biofuels create competition
between poor people in the developing world and energy consumers in the developed world.
While higher priced commodities can bring direct benefits to farmers, these benefits will not be
attained without significant and sustained investments in agriculture to increase production and
in programs that reduce price volatility.
High and volatile food prices make local production even more important for food insecure
regions. With high prices and continually increasing transportation costs, producing more
locally will become an important source of vitality for programs focused on reducing poverty
(FAO 2007). The recent entry into small-scale agricultural investment by the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation has added new vibrancy to efforts focused on understanding barriers to
increasing yields and sustaining production in the face of climate change.
This paper explores the convergence of three different trends: changes in agricultural production,
changing climate, and increasing population. Our assumption in the analyses presented here is
that the fact that some countries have substantially less purchasing power than others will persist
over the next several decades. Although global trade is important, we assume that regions with
small agriculturally based economies today are unlikely to transform themselves into industrial
nations without first improving their agricultural productivity (Kates 2000; Fafchamps 2004;
Haggblade 2007). The collision between increasing global food demand, competition for food
with developed world energy consumers, and increasingly difficult production conditions means
that the food security situation is likely to worsen before it gets better. Climate change will
potentially bring reduced rainfall over some regions, and increased rainfall over others. The
impact of these changes on agriculture must be anticipated and planned for (Verhagen et al.
2004).
To this end, this paper examines probable trends in per capita cereal production and rainfall. If
the current rates of yield and population increases persist, many regions will see substantial
declines in cereal
 availability. Greenhouse gas-induced reductions in monsoonal rainfall could
exacerbate these grain shortages. On the other hand, relatively modest yield improvements in the
least developed nations could lead to improved levels of per capita cereal production by 2030. If
done sustainably, raising yields in these poorest nations may be the most technologically feasible
way of addressing global cereal demands while reducing poverty and food insecurity.
1 Between 2000 and 2007, increased biofuel demand contributed 30 percent of the weighted average increase of
global grain prices. Personal communication, Joachim von Braun, IFPRI, October 2008.
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2.0 Data
This study uses five sets of data (Table 1): agricultural statistics, population, observed rainfall,
and simulated rainfall from 10 different global climate models (Table 2). Based on primitive
equations describing the conservation of mass, momentum, radiation, and other key dynamic
controls, the global climate models simulate the full atmosphere at ~6 hourly time steps. These
models may be constrained by observed sea surface temperatures (SSTs), or run coupled with
ocean models in full simulation mode. When constrained by observed SSTs, the models produce
circulations resembling the observed atmosphere. We use 24 of these 20 th century (1980-2000)
simulations from 10 models to examine how well the models recreate observed seasonal rainfall
variations between 1980 and 2000 (represented by the GPCP rainfall observations). Our study
also examines 21 st century CO2 doubling climate change simulations (Meehl et al. 2007). When
coupled to ocean models and forced by projected trends in greenhouse gasses and aerosols,
climate simulations can be used to examine the impact due to anthropogenic emissions into the
atmosphere. This study examines 28 simulations from a standard emission scenario: the
SRESA1B. Under this scenario, atmospheric CO2 concentrations are assumed to double by 2100.
3.0 Methods
We describe below the approach taken by our regional food balance trend analysis, our analysis
of climate change scenarios, and our detailed analyses of Eastern African food security
projections.
3.1 Regional food balance projections
One basic tenet of our work is that food availability plays a critical and increasing role in food
security. Following the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization’s division of the world into 18
regions2 , and using 1961-2007 data on total cereal yields, harvested area, and total population,
we can write a simple equation describing per capita cereal production ( c , [kg per person per
year]) in terms of total harvested area ( a, [hectares, 1 ha = 100 m x 100 m]), total population (n ,
[people]), and total annual cereal yields (y , [kg per ha per year]).
eq. 1
Per capita cereal production (c) is a large region, a is harvested area in hectares (1 hectare = 100
m x 100 m), n is the total population, and y is annual yield expressed in kilograms per hectare.
This is a coarse metric that clearly ignores many important food security variables related to
nutrition, access, trade, vulnerability, pastoral livelihoods, etc. (Davis et al. 2001; Deve reux and
Maxwell 2001). Nonetheless, per capita cereal production is an important indicator of food
availability, especially in large landlocked regions with large agrarian populations. This
restriction applies to most of Africa, Asia, and Southern America. We examine FAO statistics
averaged over very large multi-national regions, and this tends to diminish the relative impact of
cross-border trade. Another advantage of this approach is transparency. We can examine trends
2 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm
in per capita harvested area and yields and diagnose their relationship to per capita agricultural
production, analyzing shifts in agricultural production and baseline vulnerability.
Conceptually, per capita production can be divided into ‘pessimist’ and ‘optimist’ tendencies
(Fig. 1); Per capita harvested area declines while yields increase. Since 1961, in almost all
regions of the world, the population (n) has grown faster than the harvested area (a), so that the
per capita planted area decreases with time. Per capita harvested area thus represents the
interaction of finite environmental resources with an expanding population. Other related factors,
such as land degradation and soil nutrient depletion, are likely to operate in the same limiting
sense (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987).
Yield trends, on the other hand, denote increases in human knowledge, innovation, social and
economic organization, as well as the ability and willingness to invest in improving agricultural
production (Lo and Sene 1989; Watts 1989; Turner et al. 1993). Yield trends everywhere in the
world, have been positive over the past 50 years (Cassman et al. 2003). Together, per capita
harvested area and yield trends describe the direction of per capita cereal production, one major
determinant of food security.
Our focus is not on identifying individual food crises but on exploring slow changes in
agricultural sustainability. Therefore, for this study we have used 10 year averages of 	 and
for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000-2007. Denoting trends with over-arrows, we
can express approximate tendencies in per capita cereal as a function of time.
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In order to better grasp the human impacts of shifting relationships between population and
cereal production, we define a ‘theoretical population without food’ or p.
p = [(ay) – (ng)] g -1	 eq. 5
In this equation, p is the theoretical population without food, measured in units of people, (ay) is
annual cereal production [kg per year], and g is the annual grain requirement p r person [kg per
person per year]. In practice, g varies substantially between cultures and livelihood groups. In
this study, we assume a caloric requirement of 1,900 calories and typical caloric content of 3,600
calories per kilogram of grain. This leads to an annual grain requirement, in theory, of 190
kilograms of grain per year. This calculation, of course, presumes a perfect distribution of grain,
and no use of cereal for biofuels, livestock, alcohol, or other purpose (Pech et al. 2005, Cassman
2007). On the other hand, it also ignores imports and other sources of nutrition. While only a
rough approximation of food availability, equation 5 gives us a means of approximating the
magnitude of cereal deficits and surpluses. Regions experiencing large cereal deficits may have
theoretical food balances with large negative values, indicating that millions of people may
experience food shortages. On the other hand, some regions may have large grain surpluses,
capable, in theory, of supporting millions of people. It is important to note that this calculation
assumes a low baseline consumption rate.
3.2 Climate Change Rainfall Projections
Because global climate models represent terrestrial rainfall poorly, it is often preferable to focus
on how large scale climate features that they represent well. Two such patterns are rainfall over
central Indian Ocean (IO) and the 1 st principal component (PC 1) of global seasonal precipitation.
We describe these indicators, evaluate how they might change during the early 21 st century, and
use these changes to predict 2050 shifts in mean rainfall.
The central Indian Ocean is a critical driver of drought along the eastern seaboard of Africa
(Verdin et al. 2005). Greenhouse gas emissions have led to a much warmer Indian Ocean; this
warming disrupts onshore moisture transports into Southern and Eastern Africa, substantially
reducing main season rainfall, especially during the six months between December and May
(Funk et al., 2008). In this study, we use seasonal March-April-May (MAM), June-July-August
(JJA), September-October-November (SON), and December-January-February (DJF) rainfall
totals averaged between 0-15°S and 60-90°E to represent Indian Ocean warming. We refer to this
indicator as ‘IO,’ for ‘Indian Ocean3 ’.
Variations in the tropical Pacific Ocean also drive global changes in precipitation. The most
important time variations of global rainfall anomalies can be summarized by their ‘principal
components’, or PCs, which are time series designed to succinctly summarize the underlying
data. The first principal component of global rainfall (PC 1) is strongly correlated with El Ni–o
and tropical SSTs in the central-eastern tropical Pacific.
3 Please note that this indicator is distinct from the Indian Ocean dipole, which compares sea surface temperature
(SST) anomalies in the southeastern and northwestern tropical Indian Ocean.
In this study we briefly examine the IO and PC 1 s from a large set of climate change simulations
(Table 2). Using historical observations, we then statistically link variations in our two indicators
with variations in observed terrestrial rainfall. These hybrid dynamic-statistical models rely on
the climate models to predict the changing behavior of large scale climate features. They rely on
statistics to interpret the local implications of these changes. Two hybrid statistical-dynamic
reformulations are presented: a global reformulation (Brown and Funk, 2008) and a higher
resolution analysis focused on eastern and southern Africa.
Note that this hybrid statistical
 -dyn mic technique is quite distinct from the evaluations provided
by the IPCC (Solomon et al. 2007). Our statistical downscaling approach tends to identify
declines in monsoonal precipitation in Asia and Eastern Africa, where the IPCC simulations tend
to suggest increasing rainfall.
3.3 Detailed analysis of Eastern African food aid tendencies.
We will then present a more detailed discussion of food security tendencies in Eastern and
Southern Africa. Specifically, we analyze Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho. This region
broadly aligns with the FAO’s ‘Eastern Africa’ region (FAO 2007). Climatically, this collection
of nations along the eastern edge of Africa falls into two groups. The southern states experience
a single rainfall maximum during the December-February (DJF) season. The northern states, in
the Greater Horn of Africa, typically experience two rainfall maximums: maxima one, MAM and
the other during SON. Ethiopia and Eritrea have a JJA maximum. We have included Tanzania
within Southern Africa because DJF is the most agriculturally productive season.
The objective of the analysis is to estimate the relationship between main season rainfall,
agricultural statistics, population figures, and World Food Program food aid totals for each of
these nations over the 1979-present time period. Log-linear empirical models of national annual
cereal production were created by regressing historical FAO production figures against main
season rainfall, harvested area, and seed, and fertilizer inputs.
eq. 6
Where r is main season rainfall expressed as a percent of the historical mean, a is harvested area,
s is input seed, and f represents fertilizer use; p is total cereal production [kg], and b1..4 are
coefficients determined by regression between the natural logs of p, r, a, s, and f. Seed and
fertilizer statistics, again obtained from FAO, are measured in kilograms per year. Combining
this equation with equation 1 allows us to separate the primary environmental variation (rainfall)
from ‘structural’ components of national per capita cereal production.
eq. 7
In this equation c is per capita cereal production [kg per person per year]. This expression is
similar to equation 1, but more explicit. The key factors controlling yields (seeds, fertilizer and
rainfall) are now included. This gives us a quantitative means to diagnose the impacts of drought
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and changes in seed and fertilizer use. We can further separate equation 7 into an environmental
portion (e) and human (h) components.
c = eh
e = b1r
h =(b2a • b3s • b4f • n-1)	 eq. 8
The environment component contains interannually varying weather, plus perhaps long-term
variations that may be associated with climate change. The human component encodes a
combination of population (n) and large -scale agricultural controls (harvested area a, seed use s,
and fertilizer use f, as per capita demand based on population. We refer to this combination of
factors (h) as ‘per capita agricultural capacity’. Typically, all of these terms tend to trend
strongly and vary less than rainfall on interannual time scales. Thus, agricultural capacity trends
tend to dominate food security variations on decadal time scales. Rainfall tends to vary
substantially from year to year, producing variations in production about a baseline.
For Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa, the inverse of national per capita cereal production
(i.e., a food deficit or imbalance) is strongly related to regional, decadal variations in WFP food
aid (R2=0.87, Funk et al., 2008). Area harvested trends, seeds, fertilizer, and population may be
placed in equation 8 to assess the potential impacts these tendencies have on baseline agricultural
capacity. The relative impact of rainfall versus structural elements may be assessed via equation
8. Equation 8 implies a potential for multiplicative impacts in areas experiencing both drought
and decreasing per capita agricultural capacity.
4.0 Results
4.1 Global food balance analysis
Between 1961 and 1986, global total cereal yields increased 89 percent, harvested area expanded
11 percent, and global per capita cereal production increased enormously, peaking around 1986
(Fig. 2). Population, meanwhile, grew by 60 percent over those 25 years, resulting in an increase
in per capita cereal production from 284 to 372 kg of grain per person per year. The last 21 years
(1987-2007) have seen slower population growth (a 34 percent increase) accompanied by slower
yield improvements (a 31 percent increase) and a 2 percent reduction in the total area harvested.
Surprisingly, according to FAO and UN statistics, per capita harvested area and fertilizer, and
seed use have all declined by 20-30 percent (Fig. 2). Presumably, higher yielding seeds, double
cropping of rice, irrigation, and more effective farming techniques have made up for lower per
capita inputs. Per capita production stands now at about 350 kg of cereal per person per year, 6
percent below the 1986 peak.
The relative stabilization of global per capita production masks the increased use of cereals for
biofuels, alcohol, and meat production, as well as significant variations between regions.
Population growth rates vary tremendously geographically (Table 3). Four regions have more
than doubled their population since 1980: Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Middle Africa, and
Western Asia. Central America, Southern America, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Southern
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Asia, and Southeastern Asia have seen their populations increase by more than 50 percent. Since
1980, two out of every three people born now live in Asia. Another one out of four lives in
Africa.
Across most of Africa, harvested area has increased substantially more than yields (Funk et al.,
2008). In Eastern Africa, for example, yields have only increased by 25 percent since 1980,
while harvested area increased by 55 percent. In Western Africa yields increased by 42 percent
while harvested area increased by 127 percent. Yields, per capita harvested area, and production
remain very low. Across much of the rest of the world, harvested areas have remained fairly
steady, and yields have been the primary driver of agricultural growth. Our evaluation of FAO
statistics shows that Southern America, Northern America, Eastern, Southern and Southeastern
Asia have experienced greater than 70% increases in yields since 1980. Today, huge regional
disparities in yields remain the norm. In 2007, cereal yields varied by almost 600 percent, from
~1,000 kilograms per hectare in Middle Africa, to more than 5,000 kilograms per hectare in
Northern America, Eastern Asia, and Europe4.
Given that global and regional tendencies in per capita harvested area and yields appear fairly
predictable (R2>0.8) at decadal scales (Fig. 1), we may plausibly use the observed trends to
project to 2030. Table 4 presents the anticipated 2007 to 2030 changes, expressed as kilograms
of cereals per person per year, and as percent changes compared to 2007. Figure 3 shows the
historical and projected per capita cereal production for selected regions. Globally, we may
anticipate a return to per capita production levels similar to those in the late 1960s, when per
capita production was near 327 kg per person. Eastern Asia may return to 1980s production
levels (near 300 kg person -1) and Southern Asia to 1960s levels ( near 200 kg person -1 ). Declines
in heavily populated Asia could re-expose millions of people to chronic undernourishment5.
Central and Southern America may experience 18-20 percent declines in per capita cereal
production levels. Eastern and Middle Africa, however, may be hit hardest of all, with more than
30 percent reductions in already low per capita cereal production levels, with Eastern Africa
going from 131 kg per year in 2007 to 84 kg per person per year in 2030. United Nations (UN)
projections suggest that the population of Eastern Africa will increase by 191 million people by
2030—a net increase second only to Southern Asia.
While imprecise, it is instructive to evaluate simple food balance equations, looking at the
number of people who could be reasonably supported by the anticipated levels of grain
production (Table 4). We do this by calculating the theoretical population without food (equation
5). Globally, our 2030 food balance estimates suggest that as today, we will still have enough
grain to maintain our human population, albeit at a low baseline value of 1,900 calories a day.
This estimate, however, does not take into account grain consumption associated with livestock
consumption, biofuels, or industrial applications.
Most of the production increases supporting these surpluses may occur in Eastern and Southern
Asia and Northern America, where our modeling suggests 47 percent and 28 percent of new
4 Note that this study uses FAO cereal yields data. The specific commodities will vary substantially by region.
5 Note that due to a short historical archive, we have not modeled central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). This region is likely to exhibit similar trends in food security, potentially
further exacerbated by increasing temperatures and water scarcity.
production will occur, driven by 25 to 35% increases in yields. Our projected yields in Eastern
Asia and Northern America reach 7,500 kg ha -1 . Yields of this magnitude assume further
innovation and increasing petrochemical inputs, and may be technically infeasible (Cassman et
al., 2003). However, regionally, a continuance of recent trends that include vast disparities of
access to food will likely expose hundreds of millions more people to chronic food insecurity,
even if we ignore increasing cereal demands driven by biofuels and increased consumption.
With a 2030 population on the order of 2.1 billion, Southern Asia will face substantial food
availability challenges. Our 2030 projections suggest a per capita cereal production of 193 kg per
person per year (Table 4). This level is slightly above our semi-arbitrary subsistence threshold of
190 but substantially (38 percent) below the 2007 value of 231. Hence, while our theoretical
‘food balance’ suggests sufficiency, real conditions will likely result in chronic food shortages
for large segments of this diverse region who have negligible purchasing power. By 2050, our
theoretical food balance (equation 5) suggests that regional cereal production might only be
adequate for 90 percent of the population, leaving a shortfall equivalent to the consumption of
373 million people. Substantial water scarcity intensified by anthropogenic increases in air
temperature and evaporation (Parry et al. 2007), will further hamper agricultural expansion.
Central Asia appears likely to face challenges4 similar to those of Southern Asia.
Africa, especially Eastern and Western Africa, where cereal crops provide the majority of
calories, will face substantial and increasing food security challenges. Per capita cereal
production in Eastern Africa may decrease from a low 131 kg per person per year in 2007 to a
very low 84 kg per person per year in 2030. This decline almost triples the theoretical food
imbalance from -96 million in 2007 to -277 million people in 2030. This corresponds to 32
percent of the total population in 2007 and 56 percent of the population in 2030. Western Africa
faces a similar, albeit more modest, decline in per capita production (from 189 to 166 kg per
person per year). Our theoretical food balance suggests that this could expose about 61 million
people, or 14 percent of the population to chronic food shortages.
In this analysis, Africa and Asia emerge as likely foci for continuing decreases in food
availability and security. Rapidly growing populations and increasing temperature will place
further demands on scarce water supplies. Biofuels and rising demand by the global middle class
will likely compete for global production, raising prices and reducing food access for rural and
urban poor. Eighty-eight percent of the 2007-2030 population growth will occur in African and
Asian countries which will be strongly influenced climatically by the rapidly warming Indian
and Pacific tropical Oceans (Funk et al., 2008, Brown & Funk, 2008). We now turn our attention
briefly to potential anthropogenic changes in these climate indicators.
4.2 Climate Change Analysis
4.2.1 Potential climate changes in the IO and PC1 climate indicators
What do global climate change models tell us about 21 st century rainfall? The models (Table 2),
on average, tend to suggest increases in tropical rainfall over the Indian Ocean and tropical
Pacific Oceans (Fig. 4). In these regions with very warm surface waters, there is a tight coupling
between SSTs and tropical atmospheric dynamics. Future warming of the oceans appears likely
to create increased rainfall over the tropical Indian and Pacific basins. This increased oceanic
rainfall will release large amounts of energy into the atmosphere, impacting global and regional
circulations. We can quantify the magnitude of these impacts by using the 21 st
 century climate
change simulations to calculate the PC1 and IO climate indicators (see Section 3.2).
In general, the areas of increasing precipitation (blue areas in Fig. 4) correspond positively, to the
geographic footprint of both PC 1 and IO, and the suite of models examined suggests that both
PC1 and IO will increase by 2050 (Fig. 5). The global (PC 1) response, which corresponds
strongly to warming the central Pacific, appears to strengthen in all seasons. The IO warming
appears much stronger during March-April-May (MAM) and December-January-February (DJF)
than June-July-August (JJA) or September-October-November (SON). There is an inherent
uncertainty in all these projections however, due to differences in model formulations, natural
decadal variations in the climate, and the imperfect simulations of key processes, such as El
Nifio. We can attempt to quantify this uncertainty by looking at the differences between the
simulations. The lines on Fig. 5 show the 68% confidence intervals obtained from these
differences. In summary, the models appear to agree on substantial increases in the PC1 and IO
indicators, implying associated changes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans circulations, but there is
still a high level of uncertainty as to the actual magnitude of the changes.
When dealing with climate change simulations, it is very important to realize how poorly these
models tend to represent rainfall over land. The top panel of Fig. 6 shows the average seasonal
correlation between 1980-2000 observed and modeled rainfall. Each grid box shows the
correlation for the season (DJF, MAM, JJA, SON) with the highest mean rainfall. In general,
areas over the tropical oceans are handled well by the climate models, and have reasonably high
correlations. In the Indian and Pacific Oceans, these areas also tend to be areas showing
substantial increases in rainfall (Fig. 4). The situation, however, is quite different over the land
areas. In almost all these areas, historical evaluations suggest very low levels of correlation (r <
0.3). This low level of skill makes climate change analysis of ‘raw’ climate change rainfall
simulations problematic. The next section present an alternative approach, based on hybrid-
dynamic-statistical reformulations.
4.2.2 Hybrid dynamic-statistical reformulations of 21 st
 century climate change simulations
Hybrid dynamic-statistical reformulations (Funk et al., 2008; Brown and Funk, 2008) provide
one potential way to work around the limitations of global climate models. Instead of using the
climate model precipitation directly, we use regression (based on historical data) to relate
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changes at some location to large scale climate indicators (such as PC1 or IO, Fig. 5). This is
especially useful when we have strong prior evidence linking changes in tropical oceanic rainfall
and SSTs to terrestrial rainfall. The bottom panel of Fig. 6 shows such precipitation
reformulations for the globe (Brown and Funk, 2008), based on the 1 St and 2nd principal
components of global precipitation. This approach suggests that substantial rainfall declines may
appear over Central America, northern South America, Africa, and parts of Southern Asia, and
Australia.
For more detailed spatial analysis, we can use regressions between African rainfall and PC1 and
IO time-series to downscale anticipated 21 st
 century shifts in these climate forcings. These results
are shown in Fig. 7. The season with the highest mean rainfall was selected (left panel, Fig. 7).
Regression equations linking PC1 and IO to the local rainfall were then estimated. For most
areas, these models explained between 40 and 70 percent of the variance. For parts of sub-
tropical Eastern Africa and Southern Africa near the Indian Ocean, increasing IO and PC1 values
are associated with increasing aridity; warm anomalies in the south-central Indian Ocean and
moderate-to-strong ENSO events are typically associated with below normal MAM or DJF
rainfall. These historical relationships, combined with projected increases in the IO and ENSO-
like PC1 indicators (Fig. 5), suggest continued declines in rainfall across southern Ethiopia,
Somalia, Kenya, northern Tanzania, southern Mozambique and southern Zimbabwe. While
considerable uncertainty remains, it appears plausible, and even likely, that portions of
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and southern Ethiopia may experience
greenhouse gas induced rainfall reductions over the next 40 years. If warming the Pacific and
Indian Ocean continues, as suggested by climate change models (Fig. 4), anthropogenic drought
appears likely to impact one of the most food insecure regions of the world.
Our conclusions are generally in agreement with the most recent 4th IPCC finding that semiarid
Africa may experience large-scale water stress and yield reductions by 2020 (Solomon et al.
2007). Our work, however, avoids the direct use of terrestrial precipitation simulations due to
their low accuracy (Fig. 6a). Focusing on downscalings (Fig. 7) of climate forcing diagnostics
(Fig. 5), however, suggests further drying, especially for Eastern Africa, where the IPCC report
(Solomon et al. 2007) suggests that precipitation will increase. Future expansion of this work
into Asia could help confirm the potential decline in the Asian monsoon suggested by our global
reformulations (Fig. 6b).
4.3 Detailed African Food Security Analysis
In Africa, the trends driving food security evolve in a complex landscape. In Table 5 we show
selected agricultural, food aid, and population statistics for 18 semiarid food insecure countries
in Western Africa, Eastern Africa and the eastern part of Southern Africa. Data for Ethiopia and
Eritrea were combined, as they were united before 1993. Geographic variations between these
three regions play a strong role in their level of agricultural self-sufficiency. In 2005, the
Western African countries had, on average, three times as much harvested area as Eastern Africa
(0.26 versus 0.08 ha person-1 ). Per capita harvested areas for southeastern portions of Southern
Africa are only slightly higher than Eastern Africa (0.10 ha per person -1).
 There are also
considerable differences in per capita harvested area between the countries in each of these
regions.
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For these countries, harvested area largely determines national cereal production totals 6 . Over the
period 2001-2005, the relatively food secure Sahelian countrie s have per capita agricultural
capacity values (h, equation 8) above 190 kg person -1 year-1 . Over the same period, the
southeastern Africa and Greater Horn countries had agricultural capacity values of 122 and 99 kg
person-1 year-1 , respectively. Seed and fertilizer inputs are limited. In 2005, fertilizer inputs were
typically below 20 kg ha -1 in these low productivity zones.
Low yield growth combined with declining per capita harvested area has led to decreases in per
capita agricultural capacity (Table 5). Because of increases in population, these food insecure
countries in Eastern, Southern and Western Africa have experienced, respectively, 18, 22, and 28
percent reductions in per capita harvested area between 1979 and 2005. Between 1979 and 2005,
per hectare fertilizer increased in the Sahel and Greater Horn and declined in eastern Southern
Africa. Of the four main users of fertilizer in 2005, Kenya had increased its fertilizer use from 21
to 67 kg ha -1 . Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland saw substantial reductions from the early
1980s.
In these semiarid countries, a strong dependence on rain-fed smallholder farming practices
results in quasi-linear relationships between seasonal rainfall, grain yields, and food deficits.
Hence, the agricultural capacity multiplied by rainfall (equation 7) is strongly related to per
capita production. The inverse of this measure (food imbalance) is related to food aid. For each
country, the food imbalance measure was regressed against 1979-2005 WFP humanitarian
assistance. This gives us a pragmatic means of translating changes in rainfall, cropped area, seed
use, and fertilizer use into an index of potential food aid requirements, grounded empirically by
historical aid figures. Due to the low per capita production, the resulting model performed well at
a regional scale for Eastern and Southern Africa (r =0.86, p=1.6x10-5) but was less accurate for
the Western African countries (r=0.48, p=4.8x10-2). We can also express agricultural sufficiency
as a theoretical food balance, based on an assumed annual cereals requirement of 190 kg per
capita. Changes in the theoretical food balance (equation 5) agree strongly with changes in WFP
food aid8 , explaining 70% and 85% of their variance at national and regional scales.
Combining observed 1994-2003 agricultural capacity trends with our projected rainfall
tendencies, we can use the model to project 2000 to 2030 food aid requirements (Fig. 8). We
show historical WFP aid figures, historical model aid figures, and results from four sets of aid
projection scenarios. The first scenario assumes that recent trends in population, rainfall, crop
area, seed use, and fertilizer use continue for the next 30 years. The second scenario is the same,
but with the change in rainfall inferred from our 1950-2005 Indian Ocean regressions and 21 st
century climate simulations. The third scenario assumes that precipitation levels will remain
similar to those observed today. The fourth is an ‘agricultural growth’ scenario, in which
observed rainfall trends continue, but per capita food availability is assumed to increase by 2 kg
per person per year.
6 R2=0.96 for 1979 -2005 mean area vs. production totals for these 18 countries.
7 Sparsely populated Mauritania and groundnut-dependent Senegal are not well modeled in this analysis structure.
8 We admit to a certain circularity of argument here. FAO food balance calculations have been used to guide
WFP aid distributions, helping to enforce a tautological relationship. The data we choose to collect often follows
closely our pre-existing observations, and tend to follow our theoretical paradigms (Kuhn 1962). Kuhn TS (1962)
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These results suggest that the interaction between drought and declining agricultural capacity
(which includes population growth) may be explosive, dangerous, and costly, with annual aid
totals increasing by 83 percent by 2030. The ‘observed’ versus ‘projected’ trends differ primarily
for the Sahel (Fig. 8). The impact of climate change on the Sahel is keenly debated, and our
analysis explicitly ignores influences from the Atlantic Ocean. Current agricultural capacity and
rainfall trends will likely produce a 60 percent increase in food aid expenditures in the next two
decades, and will likely lead to a 43 percent increase in food insecurity in Africa. These figures
are significant because food aid is a proxy indicator for a host of related problems including child
malnutrition, as well as declines in health, productivity, and economic growth (FAO, 2007) .
Including limitations in growth of harvested area and the impacts of increased growing season
temperatures and potential evapotranspiration would inflate all these aid projections. Two
hundred million sub-Saharan Africans were undernourished in 2002, and if the observed 1982-
2002 trend continues this total may climb to almost 600 million people by 2030.
4.4 World Yield Analyses
We conclude by presenting graphically (Fig. 9), a set of projected and target agricultural yield
values for the FAO regions. The projected yields are those based on 1961-2007 linear trend
models. Annual yield trends vary significantly by region. North America, Western Europe, and
Eastern Asia have seen increases of over 700 kg ha-1 annum-1 . Projections (Fig. 9a) for some of
these regions in 2030 reach beyond 7,000 kg ha -1 . These projected yields may be beyond
practical limits (Cassman et al. 2003). Western, Middle, and Eastern Africa, conversely, have
exhibited very slow growth in yields (Table 5), with annual changes in yields of less than
110 kg ha-1 annum-1 . Without accelerated agricultural development, 2030 yields will still be very
low.
Figure 9a also shows the anticipate 2007 to 2030 transition in per capita production [kg person -1
annum-1 ]. The 2007 value in kg per person per year is shown to the left of the arrow, the 2030
prediction is shown to the right.
Substantial reductions appear likely for Southern and Central America, Western and Eastern
Africa, and Southern and Eastern Asia. Middle Africa and central Asia may exhibit similar
tendencies but were not modeled due to data limitations. Projected 2030 yields in Central
America, Western and Eastern Africa, and Southern Asia remain low, below 4,000 kg ha -1
annum- 1 .These two scenarios contrast ‘business as usual’
 outcomes with plausible agricultural
growth patterns. In the former, future yield trends are assumed to be the same as 1961-2007 yield
trends (Table 3). In the latter scenario, we set baseline per capita cereal production targets and
solve for the necessary yields in 2030.
The ‘business as usual’ projected yields analysis (Fig. 9a) displays three key characteristics: i)
yield trends and 2030 yield outcomes vary dramatically by region, ii) in developed nations a
continuance of observed yield trends may result in physically unrealistic results, and iii) in
Africa, Central America and Southern Asia, a continuance of current trends will result in very
low levels of food availability. Given increasing globalization and technological limits, one
might imagine that yields would have converged since 1960. This has not been the case; rather
the green revolution has followed a course in which the ‘green get greener’, with growth then
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slowing above 5,000 kg per ha per year. Yields in 1961 have been a very good predictor of yields
in 2007 (R2=0.8.6); countries with lower yields have tended to increase their yields more slowly.
This has enhanced differences between nations. In 1961 the highest regional yields were four
times the lowest. This ratio rose to nine in 2007. A continuance of these trends will increase this
ratio to 11 by 2030. As yield growth lags and per capita harvested areas decline, per capita cereal
production will reach dangerous levels in Africa, Central America and Southern Asia.
As an alternative to using observed yield trends from Table 3, we can specify a target 2030 per
capita production and solve directly for the required yield (Fig. 9b). This approach uses trends in
per capita harvested area but then estimates 2030 yields algebraically. Two sets of cereal
production targets were used. A minimal threshold of 190 kg ha -1 annum-1
 was specified for
African nations. The other countries were set to their 2007 values. This represents a modest
‘agricultural growth’ scenario, in which per capita production for most of the world maintains
parity with current levels and Africa experiences modest gains.
This exercise suggests two salient results. First, the target yield gains for Africa appear small in
magnitude but large in ratio. Looking at Eastern Africa, for example, we see that a transition
from yields of 1,482 kg per hectare per year (Table 3) to 3,500 kg per hectare per year (Fig. 9b)
would make the region relatively food secure. This is a large percent increase, but not technically
impossible – farming efficiencies would have to approach those used in Southern America in
2007 (Fig. 9a).
A second salient feature of Fig. 9 b is that maintaining current per capita cereal production levels
in Northern America and Eastern Asia will require substantial increases in yields, well beyond
those anticipated by historical trends. As per capita harvested area diminishes rapidly in these
regions, very large increases in yields will be required to produce enough cereal to feed the
future population at its current level of per capita cereal consumption. In order for Eastern Asia
to maintain a per capita cereal production of 314 kg per person per year, yields will have to
increase from their 2007 level of 5,418 kg per hectare per year (Table 3) to a very high yield of
8,600 kg per hectare per year. This may not be technically feasible or environmentally
sustainable.
Although there is a substantial gap between maximum theore tical yield for the major world crops
of maize, rice, and wheat and actual average yields, in recent years the gains in yields have
declined. Rice yields in China and Indonesia and wheat yields in India and France, for example,
have not increased substantially in the past decade (Cassman et al. 2003) . Increasing yields
beyond levels attained in these countries will require either enormous investments in freshwater
irrigation systems or a transformation of the agricultural systems to incorporate new
technological advancements, both of which are highly unlikely in the next few decades.
Investing in regions with extremely low agricultural productive capacity, therefore, will be a
much less expensive way to improve global agricultural production. Bringing maize yields from
700 to 5,000 kg per hectare is far easier than increasing yields from 7,000 kg per hectare to 8,000
kg per hectare (Naylor 1996). This observation turns the standard food security paradigm on its
head. With lower population growth and more effective farming practices, by 2030 it could be an
agriculturally active Africa that helps alleviate global shortages of cereal production.
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5.0 Conclusions
Food security and agricultural production are not directly linked. Politics, economics and access
are also critical issues. In countries that experience significant levels of hunger, however,
productive capacity is an important constraint, made more salient by increasing food price
volatility. Investment in further productive capacity in regions with growing populations remains
a challenge. This paper has presented analyses that show that without concerted effort, today’s
food security crisis will continue to accelerate, robbing millions of people of their potential
livelihoods. Our results suggest that large -scale trends in yields and per capita harvested area
(Fig. 2) are very predictable. We can be quite certain that the world will experience significant
reductions in food availability as consumption demands increase due to biofuels and rising living
standards.
Some parts of the developing world, like Southern Asia, may have 2030 per capita production
levels similar to those of the 1960s or 1970s (Fig. 3). Other regions, such as Eastern Africa, face
burgeoning food crises if current trends persist (Fig. 9). Greenhouse gas induced warming in the
tropical Indian Ocean (Funk et al. 2008) and Pacific Ocean (Brown and Funk 2008) could
exacerbate the likelihood of drought across many food producing regions (Figs. 6 & 7).
Anthropogenic drought appears quite likely to affect chronically insecure Eastern Africa. In
Kenya, the 2007 and 2008 long and short rains appear to be the worst since 1979 (Funk and
Verdin, 2009). Our food balance modeling (Fig. 8), however, suggests that agricultural
development is likely to be a reasonable and effective mitigation strategy. The alternative may be
a continued and expensive increase in chronic food aid.
Less certain but plausible climate change impacts on Southern Asia could also threaten
agricultural production. Anthropogenic drought in Southern Asia (Fig. 6b), combined with
declining per capita harvested areas, could lead to an explosive decrease in cereal availability,
below the return to 1970 levels anticipated by our trend analysis (Fig. 3).
Many trends affect agricultural sustainability. It is important to recognize the complexity and
interaction of these different factors. At the farm level, land modifications, plot landscape
positioning, alternative crops or varieties, in-soil vegetative material, and well-placed
biodiversity can all play a role in countering unfavorable climatic events. Degradation in soil
quality and in the overall natural resource base may threaten the long-run viability of several of
the world’s most intensive agricultural systems. Combined with monocultures of improved crops
supported through high levels of inputs, much can be done to increase agricultural productivity
in regions that currentl
 y produce 10 percent or less of their theoretical potential (Brown and
Funk 2008). Agricultural innovations require political and economic stability, investment, and
societal learning that must be sustained over relatively long periods. Some places in the
developing world have managed to capitalize on new techniques and technology to significantly
increase production , such as in Kenya’s main maize growing districts where maize yields have
increased from 3,000 to 5,000 kg per hectare in the past eight years 9. These gains are threatened
when national political crises cut off roads, restrict access to critical inputs, and cause uncertainty
9 Personal communication, Curt Reynolds, August 2008.
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in export contracts. The context in which production occurs is just as important as production
itself.
Economic growth, improved food security, and wide -scale poverty reduction all require
productivity gains in agriculture (Haggblade 2007) . Agriculture serves as a powerful engine of
poverty reduction, one which can bring the poorest a rapid improvement in income through
direct technology transfer. According to Michael Lipton, “no country has achieved mass dollar
poverty reduction without prior investment in agriculture” (Lipton 2005). Available evidence
suggests that investment in public goods such as agri cultural research, agricultural extension, and
road networks constitutes one of the most effective tools available for stimulating economic
growth and poverty reduction. Increasing per capita agricultural production in regions that
currently have very low yields can be achieved with investment in these public goods (Platteau
1996, Lamb 2000). These investments can result in significant gains in incomes, and reduction in
poverty, which will reduce the number of people chronically malnourished.
Improved economic development, aid, and agricultural policies, backed by adequate resources,
can prevent humanitarian crises. Improved agricultural capacity is one of many reasonable ways
we can reduce vulnerability within Africa. Improved seed and fertilizer distribution can enhance
yields, as can better land tenure and management policies. Expensive and potentially disruptive
food aid shipments are much smaller than domestic African crop production. Since local cereal
production is 100 times greater than food aid totals, modest increases in African food production
could eradicate food production shortfalls. Our food balance modeling (Figure 8), suggests that
modest increases in yield would help eliminate the need for most external shipments of food aid.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to sincerely thank our anonymous reviewers, as
well as colleagues from the USGS who graciously supplied their comments. Without their efforts
this paper would be much less coherent. We would also like to express our gratitude to the UN
Food and Agricultural Organisation and the Program for Climate Model Diagnostics and
Intercomparison for providing, respectively, access to the agriculture and climate modeling data
used in this study. This research has been supported by funding from the US Agency for
International Development Famine Early Warning System Network, the NASA Precipitation
Monitoring Mission (grant NNX07AG26G), and a NASA decision support project (Cooperative
Agreement Notice NN-H-04-Z-YO-010-C).
16
Figure and Table Legends
Table 1. Sources of agricultural, social and climate data used in this analysis.
Table 2. Number of 20th centurya (1980-2000) & 21 st centuryb
 (2000-2100) simulations used in
this study. These model simulations are produced by premier climate modeling groups c in the
United States, Europe and Asia.
Table 3. This table shows relevant agricultural statistics for 2007 obtained from the FAO. Unless
international trade and aid can make up the difference, areas with theoretical food balance
deficits will face systematic food shortages. The magnitude of these shortages can be evaluated
by looking at the food balance deficits expressed as percentages of the total population. With
some exceptions, regions with the largest population increases over the past 27 years also have
the largest per capita food deficits.
Table 4. Global and regional projections of per capita cereal production (equation 1) and
theoretical food balance (equation 5) statistics. These values were based on 2030 estimates of
yields and per capita harvested area. Overall, and on average for the world, there will be 48 kg
less of cereal production per person per year in 2030, a 14% reduction over the 354 kg per
person produced in 2007.
Table 5. Selected African agriculture and population statistics from the FAO.
Fig.1 Oberserved (FAO) and modeled global cereal trends in per capita harvested area and
yields. Data values have been averaged by decades. The filled circles show observed global
cereal yields. Decadal increases in global yields are fit very well by a linear trend model (filled
circles). The open boxes show observed per capita harvested area decreases. Decadal decreases
in global per capita harvested areas are also fit very well by a linear trend model (filled boxes).
The relative rates of yield increases and per capita harvested area decreases can be used to
predict future per capita cereal production.
Fig. 2 Global per capita cereal production statistics, expressed as fractions of a 1986 baseline.
Data were obtained from FAO. Population figures are based on estimates from the United
Nations.
Fig. 3 Time-series of per capita cereal production for the world, Eastern Africa, Southern Asia,
Eastern Asia, and Central America. Values beyond 2007 are projections.
Fig. 4 Multi-model ensemble precipitation changes for the 21 st century. These plots show the
average change in rainfall for the 21 st century, based on a large set of climate change scenarios
(Table 2). The output from these simulations was averaged for each season (March-April-May:
panel A, June-July-August: panel B, September-October-November: panel C, December-
January-February: panel D). Trends over the 2000-2100 time period were then calculated and
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plotted. The model simulation shows substantial increases in rainfall over the oceans, which is
the only place the models have a meaningful level of skill.
Fig. 5 Summary of our global (PC 1, x-axis) and Indian Ocean (IO, y-axis) and precipitation
climate change analyses. All indicator time series have been standardized, with an expected
mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. Thus
 a change of +1 would indicate a shift in the
mean value equivalent to a 1 standard deviation shift. Each of the four grey dots shows the
anticipated seasonal 2050 change for a given season. The inter-model spread of the climate
models has been shown using lines spanning a 68% confidence interval.
Fig. 6. The top panel (a) shows the average correlation between the observed and modeled
rainfall during the main rainfall season. These seasons are shown with letters, D denotes DJF,
M=MAM, J=JJA, S=SON. We show the ensemble correlation, estimated by calculating the
correlation for each 20th century model simulation listed in Table 2, and then averaging. The
yellow and brown boxes are areas in which modeled rainfall is very inaccurate. The bottom panel
(b) shows our estimates of 2050 rainfall changes. These changes are based on the first two
principal components of modeled 21 st century rainfall, assuming a common CO2 doubling
scenario. These values are based on the main rainy season, and are expressed in standard
deviations. The light/dark brown boxes show a modest/considerable reduction in mean rainfall.
Results in b reprinted from Brown & Funk (2008), with the permission of AAAS.
Fig. 7 These panels describe our hybrid dynamic-statistical precipitation reformulations for
eastern and southern Africa. These reformulations are based on 21 st
 century projections of central
Indian Ocean [0-15°S, 60-90°E] precipitation and global precipitation 1 st principal components.
The left plot shows each location’s main growing season (M=MAM, J=JJA, S=SON, D=DJF).
The right plot shows downscaled 2050 rainfall projections, expressed as a percent change in
main season precipitation. IO and PC1 regression parameters are multiplied by the seasonally
appropriate changes shown in Fig. 5. This produces the anticipated change in rainfall.
Fig. 8 Results from our food balance indicator modeling for the Sahel, the Greater Horn of
Africa, and Southern Africa. The black bars show historic WFP food aid, accumulated over 13
year intervals. The grey bars show empirical food aid estimates based on regressions with
historic agricultural capacity and rainfall (cf. equation 7). The next set of bars show food aid
projections based on four different assumptions of future scenarios. The light brown, dark brown,
and yellow bars use historic agricultural capacity trends (cf. equation 8) combined with rainfall
assumed to either i) trend along observed patterns, ii) trend according to rainfall predicted from
Indian Ocean precipitation, or iii) to have no trend at all. The green bars show a scenario based
on observed rainfall trends and an agricultural growth scenario.
Fig. 9 Panel (a) shows 2030 yield projections based on historical 1961-2007 trends (cf. Table 3).
Values shown before and after arrows denote, respectively, the observed 2007 and projected
2030 per capita cereal production values in kg per person per year. Panel (b) shows targeted
yields, assuming the 2030 per capita production values on the right hand sides of the arrows
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Cereal production statistics' o 1961-2007 Food and Agriculture Organisation
http://faostat.fao.org/
Population datab o & p 1960-2050 United Nations Population Division
http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm
Annual food aid totals c o 1979-2005 World Food Programme
http://www.wfp.org/
Seasonal Rainfalld o 1979-2007 Global Precipitation Climatology Project
http://www.gewex.org/gpcp.html
20th
 and 21 st century p 1950-2100 Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and
rainfall simulations Intercomparison
http://www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/
a.United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) yield, harvested area, seed and fertilizer statistics. These data
have been pooled by commodity to include all cereal crops.
b.United Nations World Population Division mid-level population estimates and projections.
c. Total country level international food aid (food shipments plus cash subsidies), obtained from the FAO database.
d. Combined gauge and satellite rainfall estimates, totaled over three-month seasons.
e. 20th and 21 st
 climate change change rainfall simulations produced by ten different global climate models.
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Table 2. Number of 20th centurya
 (1980-2000) & 21 st centuryb (2000-2100) simulations used in this
study. These model simulations are produced by premier climate modeling groups c
 in the United
States, Europe and Asia.







GISS ER 4 2
IAP FGOALS 3 3
IPSL CM4 6 1
MIROC3.2 Hi Res 1 1
MIROC3.2 Med Res 3 3
MPIECHAM5 3 3
MRI CGCM 2.3.2a 1 5
NCAR CCSM 3.0 1 7
UKMO HADGEM 1 1 1
a.The 20th
 century simulations are based on observed sea surface temperature and atmospheric aerosol and greenhouse gas
patterns, and have been drawn from the Atmospheric Model Intercomparison Project (AMIP) experiment.
b.The 21 st
 century simulations are based on predicted a C0 2 doubling scenario (SRESAIB) provided by the IPCC. These 21 st
century climate change simulations are drawn from the World Climate Research Program's Coupled Model Interc omparison
Project phase 3 (CMIP3) multi -model dataset (Meehl et al. 2007).
c. Simulated 20th and 21 st century precipitation fields are drawn from multi-model ensembles of numerical weather predictions
obtained from the Programme for Climate Model Diagnostics and Intercomparison. Full details about these models are
available at http://www -pcmdi.llnl.gov/projects/cmip/Table.php.
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Table 3. This table shows relevant agricultural statistics for 2007 obtained from the FAO. Unless
international trade and aid can make up the difference, areas with theoretical food balance
deficits will face systematic food shortages. The magnitude of these shortages can be evaluated by
looking at the food balance deficits expressed as percentages of the total population. With some
exceptions, regions with the largest population increases over the past 27 years also have the
largest per capita food deficits.
Millions






of people e [o^ u] f [o^u]
1980-
Year(s) 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
World 6,612 3,347 0.11 354 5,548 49%
Eastern Africa 302 1,482 0.09 131 -96 -32% 107%
Middle Africa 116 967 0.06 62 -79 -68% 113%
Northern Africa 198 1,725 0.11 190 -3 -1% 77%
Southern Africa 54 2,466 0.07 182 -3 -6% 63%
Western Africa 276 1,165 0.16 189 -5 -2% 107%
N. America 337 5,913 0.23 1374 2,066 32%
Cent. America 151 2,893 0.08 243 40 67%
Caribbean 40 2,201 0.02 51 -29 -73% 36%
South America 385 3,704 0.09 349 314 59%
Central Asia 59 1,696 0.32 541 na 11%
Eastern Asia 1,541 5,418 0.06 314 967 31%
Southern Asia 1,603 2,645 0.09 231 323 71%
S-Eastern Asia 570 3,756 0.10 368 518 59%
Western Asia 223 1,985 0.10 204 13 121%
Eastern Europe 295 2,228 0.27 606 632 -18%
N. Europe 96 5,149 0.09 472 140 18%
S. Europe 146 4,147 0.10 416 169 6%
W. Europe 187 6,419 0.09 594 389 9%
Oceania 34 1,221 0.06 68 85 49%
a.UN population estimates for 2007.
b.The total FAO cereal yield for 2007 for the region.
c.The ratio of the total cereals harvested area and population.
d.Per capita production, or the ratio of the total cereal production and population.
e.The theoretical food balance defined by equation 5. This is the number of unfed people assuming a caloric cereals
requirement of 190 kg per person per year.
f.Food balance deficits expressed as percentages of the total population in 2007.g.The last column shows recent population increases, expressed a percent of the 1980 population.
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Table 4. Global and regional projections of per capita cereal production (equation 1) and
theoretical food balance (equation 5) statistics. These values were based on 2030 estimates of yields
and per capita harvested area. Overall, and on average for the world, there will be 48 kg less of






[kg person 1 ]
Change in annual per capita
production
(2030 - 2007)





World 306 -48 -14% 4,833
Eastern Africa 84 -47 -36% -277
Middle Africa 38 -24 -38% -166
Northern Africa 180 -10 -5% -18
Southern Africa 189 8 4% -1
Western Africa 166 -23 -12% -61
N. America 1,236 -138 -10% 2,168
Cent. America 199 -44 -18% 6
Caribbean 47 -4 -9% -34
South America 273 -76 -22% 203
Eastern Asia 276 -37 -12% 716
Southern Asia 193 -38 -17% 5
S-Eastern Asia 356 -12 -3% 594
Western Asia 160 -44 -22% -54
Eastern Europe 542 -64 -11% 468
N. Europe 618 146 31% 227
S. Europe 396 -20 -5% 145
W. Europe 771 176 30% 569
Oceania 1,158 484 72% 213
a.2030 yields and per capita harvested area were estimated based on 1960-2007 trends (equations 2-5), and used to derive
estimates of 2030 per capita cereal production (equation 1).
b.The difference, in kilograms per person, between projected 2030 and observed 2007 per capita cereal production.
c.The difference, expressed as a percentage change, between projected 2030 and observed 2007 per capita cereal production.
d. theoretical food balance (eq. 2) for 2030, expressed in millions of people, based on an annual cereal requirement of 190 kg
_1	 _1person year .
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Table 5. Selected African agriculture and population statistics from the FAO.
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Zimbabwe 1,126 171 -6% 6 228 117 0.19 0.13 85 66 -3
Zambia 646 -17 -5% 5 221 126 0.11 0.08 94 76 -2
Swaziland 70 9 4% 1 178 108 0.13 0.06 193 114 -3
Lesotho -41 -6 13% 1 255 245 0.16 0.15 22 43 6
Malawi 516 74 -3% 7 191 137 0.21 0.13 20 26 2
Mozambique 183 -12 2% 8 68 100 0.08 0.11 24 12 2
Tanzania 1,338 114 -13% 20 145 125 0.15 0.09 11 0 2
Kenya 1,339 48 -13% 16 147 116 0.12 0.07 21 67 0
Ethiopia/Eritrea 3,064 796 -12% 37 139 121 0.12 0.11 8 19 -2
Uganda 1,621 134 1% 15 53 56 0.07 0.06 0 4 -1
Rwanda 570 21 -3% 4 49 31 0.05 0.04 1 1 0
Burundi 470 49 -7% 3 41 26 0.05 0.03 5 12 0
Niger 271 22 16% 7 222 170 0.68 0.52 0 1 -5
Mali -169 -53 8% 7 181 199 0.21 0.27 11 12 2
Senegal 704 -87 2% 5 240 133 0.20 0.11 27 28 -2
Mauritania 170 -26 16% 2 162 106 0.08 0.05 17 20 -4
Burkina Faso -695 -24 5% 7 140 209 0.31 0.22 0 1 4
Chad -48 1 4% 5 216 203 0.25 0.20 0 10 -2
a The difference in the theoretical population without food (equation 5) calculated with 2007 and 1980 data.
b The difference WFP food aid in 2007 and 1980.
c The change in main growing season rainfall, averaged over 1992-2005 and 1979-1991, expressed as a percent of the 1979-2005 mean.
d The change in total population between 2005 and 1979, expressed in millions.
e Per capita agricultural capacity (h) as defined by equation 8, with units of kg of cereal production per person per year, based on FAO statistics.
f Per capita harvested area, based on FAO statistics.
B Per hectare fertilizer use, based on FAO statistics.
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Fig.1 Oberserved (FAO) and modeled global cereal trends in per capita harvested area and yields. Data
values have been averaged by decades. The filled circles show observed global cereal yields. Decadal
increases in global yields are fit very well by a linear trend model (filled circles). The open boxes show
observed per capita harvested area decreases. Decadal decreases in global per capita harvested areas are
also fit very well by a linear trend model (filled boxes). The relative rates of yield increases and per
capita harvested area decreases can be used to predict future per capita cereal production.
26
Fig. 2 Global per capita cereal production statistics, expressed as fractions of a 1986 baseline. Data were
obtained from FAO. Population figures are based on estimates from the United Nations.
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Fig. 3 Time-series of per capita cereal production for the world, Eastern Africa, Southern Asia, Eastern
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Fig. 4 Multi-model ensemble precipitation changes for the 21 st century. These plots show the average
change in rainfall for the 21 st
 century, based on a large set of climate change scenarios (Table 2). The
output from these simulations was averaged for each season (March-April-May: panel A, June-July-
August: panel B, September-October-November: panel C, December-January-February: panel D).
Trends over the 2000-2100 time period were then calculated and plotted. The model simulation shows




Fig. 5 Summary of our global (PC 1, x-axis) and Indian Ocean (IO, y-axis) and precipitation climate
change analyses. All indicator time series have been standardized, with an expected mean of zero and
standard deviation of 1. Thus a change of +1 would indicate a shift in the mean value equivalent to a 1
standard deviation shift. Each of the four grey dot s shows the anticipated seasonal 2050 change for a
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Fig. 6. The top panel (a) shows the average correlation between the observed and modeled rainfall
during the main rainfall season. These seasons are shown with letters, D denotes DJF, M=MAM, J=JJA,
S=SON. We show the ensemble correlation, estimated by calculating the correlation for each 20 th
century model simulation listed in Table 2, and then averaging. The yellow and brown boxes are areas in
which modeled rainfall is very inaccurate. The bottom panel (b) shows our estimates of 2050 rainfall
changes. These changes are based on the first two principal components of modeled 21 st century rainfall,
assuming a common CO2 doubling scenario. These values are based on the main rainy season, and are
expressed in standard deviations. The light/dark brown boxes show a modest/considerable reduction in
mean rainfall. Results in b reprinted from Brown & Funk (2008), with the permission of AAAS.
31
Fig. 7 These panels describe our hybrid dynamic-statistical precipitation reformulations for eastern and
southern Africa. These reformulations are based on 21 st
 century projections of central Indian Ocean [0-
15°S, 60-90°E] precipitation and global precipitation 1 st principal components. The left plot shows each
location’s main growing season (M=MAM, J=JJA, S=SON, D=DJF). The right plot shows downscaled
2050 rainfall projections, expressed as a percent change in main season precipitation. IO and PC1
regression parameters are multiplied by the seasonally appropriate changes shown in Fig. 5. This
produces the anticipated change in rainfall.
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Fig. 8 Results from our food balance indicator modeling for the Sahel, the Greater Horn of Africa, and
Southern Africa. The black bars show historic WFP food aid, accumulated over 13 year intervals. The
grey bars show empirical food aid estimates based on regressions with historic agricultural capacity and
rainfall (cf. equation 7). The next set of bars show food aid projections based on four different
assumptions of future scenarios. The light brown, dark brown, and yellow bars use historic agricultural
capacity trends (cf. equation 8) combined with rainfall assumed to either i) trend along observed
patterns, ii) trend according to rainfall predicted from Indian Ocean precipitation, or iii) to have no
trend at all. The green bars show a scenario based on observed rainfall trends and an agricultural growth
scenario.
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Fig. 9 Panel (a) shows 2030 yield projections based on historical 1961-2007 trends (cf. Table 3). Values
shown before and after arrows denote, respectively, the observed 2007 and projected 2030 per capita
cereal production values in kg per person per year. Panel (b) shows targeted yields, assuming the 2030
per capita production values on the right hand sides of the arrows
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